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Abstract
This paper investigates the returns and °ows of German money market
funds before and during the liquidity crisis of 2007/2008. The main
¯ndings of this paper are: in liquid times, money market funds en-
hanced their returns by investing in less liquid papers. By doing so
they outperformed other funds as long as liquidity in the market was
high. Investing in less liquid assets, however, widens the narrow struc-
ture of money market funds and makes them vulnerable to runs. During
the shortening of liquidity caused by the subprime crisis, illiquid funds
experienced runs, while more liquid funds functioned as a safe haven.
Keywords: Money Market Funds, Liquidity Crisis, Strategic Comple-
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Money market funds (MMFs) are normally seen as an extremely safe invest-
ment because they only invest in short-term, high-grade debt. For this reason,
MMFs should only have a minimum exposure to interest rate, credit or liquidity
risk. However, during the subprime crisis, money market funds contributed to
the crisis when the Reserve Primary Fund lowered its share value below USD1.
Redemption of shares at this and other funds caused a liquidity squeeze in the
money market. Since then, money market funds in the US but also in Europe
have experienced signi¯cant net sales. These events have led to the issuance
of new rules on both sides of the Atlantic to make money market funds more
secure.1 Both reforms provide more stringent rules for disclosure, liquidity and
credit risk. However, they di®er in that the US industry maintains a stable
share value while in Europe °oating net asset values (NAV) prevail. In this
paper, we explore the crisis of the German money market funds, which faced
severe out°ows and falling returns during the subprime crisis of 2007/2008.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the reasons for the crisis in German
money market funds.
Open-end mutual funds in general, in a similar way to banks, o®er demand
deposit contracts, meaning that investors can withdraw their money at any
time. Withdrawals, however, impose a negative externality on the remaining
investors in the fund (e.g. Edelen 1999, Nanda, Narayanan & Warther 2000).
This is because when facing out°ows, fund managers have to sell their assets
at an unfavorable time. The expectation that some investors will withdraw
their money can lead the remaining investors to follow, and can result in a
panic-based run (Diamond & Dybvig 1983, Goldstein & Pauzner 2005, Chen,
Goldstein & Jiang 2010). The likelihood of such a run increases if the negative
externality increases. Therefore, runs are more likely in funds that hold less
liquid assets.
Money market funds are perceived as a close alternative to a bank account.
With regard to the US, a stable share value and the higher interest rate paid
by money market funds has made this type of mutual fund an attractive and
widely used means of payment and cash management for retail and institu-
1The SEC published ¯nal rules on money market fund reform in February 2010. In
Europe, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) published its guidelines
on a common de¯nition of MMFs in May 2010.
1tional investors. However, given that they only invest in short-term, high grade
debt, runs used to be considered unlikely (Gorton & Pennacchi 1992, Pennac-
chi 2006). In essence, money market funds close the maturity gap that makes
banks vulnerable to runs. MMFs are therefore often considered to be \narrow
banks". As a result, MMFs can provide liquidity services without needing a
socially costly deposit insurance.
MMFs have become a signi¯cant provider of liquidity not only in the United
States but also in other countries. Since the ¯rst MMF was established in the
US in the 70s, assets have grown to a total of USD 4,957 billion in 2007 world-
wide. Overall, money market funds account for over 19% of all mutual fund
assets in the world, which makes them the second largest group after equity
funds.2 The growing relevance of MMFs as ¯nancial intermediaries makes it
important to investigate what makes them prone to runs in times of ¯nancial
turmoil.
In this article, we use a panel of German retail MMFs to study the behavior
of fund managers and investors before and during the shortening of liquidity
which started with the US subprime crisis. First, we document that the perfor-
mance of MMFs is usually highly persistent and mostly driven by the expense
ratio. Our main ¯nding is that even though returns are persistent overall,
there are some periods that do not show persistence. Most importantly, the
winning funds of 2006 (before the liquidity crisis) are the losing funds of 2007
(in the liquidity crisis) and vice versa. Second, we examine the causes for
persistence in returns. We ¯nd that not only expenses but also the portfo-
lio structure drive performance persistence. While money market funds that
invest in illiquid assets outperform during liquid times, they underperform in
illiquid times. Third, we investigate the investor °ows into and out of MMFs.
There is a signi¯cant performance-°ow relationship, meaning that investors
withdraw their money from funds that underperform and invest in funds that
outperform. More importantly, we relate investor °ows to market liquidity and
the portfolio structure of money market funds. A shock to market liquidity
can have two e®ects on investors. Investors can either continue to perceive
money market funds as a safe haven which would show in a continuing in°ow.
Alternatively, a sudden drop in market liquidity may cause investors to with-
draw their funds when they are concerned about a deterioration in the value of
2Worldwide Fund Statistics of the Investment Company Institute (ICI)
2their shares. The likelihood of a run depends crucially on the liquidity of the
portfolio. Redemptions of shares at a fund with less liquid assets will result
in higher costs and thus impose a larger negative externality on the remaining
investors. This in turn raises the probability of a run. Our results con¯rm that
in times of extreme market illiquidity, people withdraw their money from less
liquid funds and we observe run-like phenomena. Liquid funds, on the other
hand, show no signi¯cant out°ows and continue to function as a safe haven.
The results of this paper contribute to our understanding of the stability
of ¯nancial intermediaries. Our results suggest that, in a competitive environ-
ment where investors react to good or bad performance, MMF managers have
an incentive to invest in riskier assets in order to enhance their performance.
The narrow structure of MMFs is thereby widened and the probability of a
run on the fund increases. In addition, the evidence presented in this paper
shows that a °oating net asset value does not prevent a run on money market
funds.
2 Related Literature
This article refers to several strands of literature: persistence of MMF re-
turns is a well-known fact in the literature and documented by several studies
(e.g. Domian & Reichenstein 1998, Christo®ersen & Musto 2002, Dahlquist,
EngstrÄ om & SÄ oderlind 2000). Performance persistence of MMFs is generally
attributed to the strong persistence of expense ratios. Domian & Reichenstein
(1998) ¯nd that the expense ratio plus a dummy variable indicating whether
a fund exclusively invests in government securities explain 87% of the cross
sectional di®erence in net returns. They conclude that MMFs are a ¯nancial
commodity and best selected by the lowest expense ratio.
A logical question that follows is, how can MMFs with high and low ex-
pense ratios coexist in an competitive environment? Christo®ersen & Musto
(2002) argue that fund managers can charge their investors di®erent prices be-
cause they face di®erent demand curves. In particular, investors di®er in their
sensitivity to management fees. Therefore, fund managers are able to charge
higher expense ratios without losing all existing investors. This allows some
fund managers to persistently have higher expense ratios and to underperform
3other funds.
Using a non-parametric method proposed by Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbot-
son & Ross (1992), we are able to have a disaggregate view on performance
persistence of MMFs. Even though persistence in our sample is very strong
and present in the majority of years, we also ¯nd that several years show no
persistence and a reversal in performance from one year to another. The per-
sistence of expense ratios is not able to explain years without persistence or
a reversal in performance. This result suggests that an additional factor is
driving MMFs' return persistence.
Other studies argue that MMFs are not a mere commodity, meaning that
fund expenses are not the only determinant of returns. Koppenhaver (1999)
shows in a cross-sectional regression that, in addition to expenses, other port-
folio characteristics also a®ect returns. The share of agency securities and
commercial papers is assumed to be a proxy for credit risk and has a positive
e®ect on returns. Further, a higher weighted average maturity results in a
higher return. In this sense, fund managers can o®set the annual expenses and
enhance returns by increasing credit or interest rate risk.
We follow this line of argument and investigate how money market fund
managers can enhance their returns by investing in less liquid assets. This
paper contributes to the literature above in showing that the impact of liq-
uid assets is not constant over time but varies as a function of market-wide
liquidity: money market funds with illiquid assets outperform in liquid times
but underperform in illiquid times (see Acharya & Pedersen 2005, Massa &
Phalippou 2005).3
Literature abounds on the negative e®ect of out°ows on the remaining in-
vestors in the fund (e.g. Chordia 1996, Nanda, Narayanan & Warther 2000,
Edelen 1999). Redemptions create costs, which include for example liquidity-
based trading, price impact and commissions. In addition, the fund might
be forced to deviate from its desired portfolio also resulting in costs. There-
3We primarily relate the performance of MMFs to liquidity risk and not to credit and
other risks. MMFs typically invest in high-grade assets which exhibit limited credit risk.
However, the sudden and rapid downgrade of various asset classes during the subprime
crisis uncovered previously unexpected credit risks. Disentangling credit from liquidity risk
is di±cult given that, particularly in times of market-wide distress, they go hand in hand.
4fore, fund managers set front and back-end fees to dissuade redemptions, and
investors self-select themselves into a fund according to their liquidity needs
(e.g. Chordia 1996). Since it usually takes a few days for the fund manager to
restore the cash balance, the costs of redemptions mainly a®ect the remaining
investors in the fund. For this reason, withdrawals impose a negative exter-
nality on the remaining investors.
Chen, Goldstein & Jiang (2010) consider this negative externality in the
context of strategic complementarities in mutual funds. In the framework of
global games, they are able to develop testable predictions about runs (Carls-
son & van Damme 1993, Goldstein & Pauzner 2005). The expectation that
other investors will withdraw their money can cause further investors to with-
draw their money, resulting in a \self-ful¯lling run". Since the negative exter-
nality increases with the illiquidity of the fund, illiquid funds are more likely
to experience runs than liquid funds. Chen et al. (2010) argue further that
the externality caused by withdrawals can be internalized if the number of
investors is small enough. This article shows that strategic complementarities
can even exist in a relatively liquid sector of money market funds.
Finally, this article contributes to the literature concerned with the ¯nan-
cial stability of narrow banking. Banks ¯nance long-term loans with short-term
deposits. This maturity intermediation makes banks vulnerable to runs (Dia-
mond & Dybvig 1983). One remedy to avoid bank runs is to insure deposits
and thereby establish trust in the bank. Deposit insurance, however, comes
at a cost: it can lead to moral hazard because managers, insured against a
bank run, may invest in riskier assets. A possible solution to this dilemma is
the narrow banking approach (Gorton & Pennacchi 1992, Miller 1998). Since
the key problem of bank runs is the maturity gap, narrow banking suggests
reducing or eliminating this gap. The narrow banking approach proposes that
the two main functions of a bank deposit taking and lending should be sepa-
rated into two ¯rms. Instead of ¯nancing long-term obligations with demand
deposits, narrow banks rely on short-term, high-quality securities. In theory,
the reduction of the maturity gap would make narrow banks immune to bank
runs and a (socially) costly deposit insurance would not be needed. In prac-
tice, money market funds are often considered to be a form of narrow banking.
MMFs provide liquidity services to their investors by investing exclusively in
high-grade debt with short maturity and the deposits are, in contrast to banks,
5not insured.
There are a number of papers that investigate whether MMFs are indeed
immune to liquidity or credit shocks. Gorton & Pennacchi (1992) analyze in an
event study how a default in the commercial paper market a®ects the commer-
cial paper spread and whether this leads to withdrawals from money market
funds. Their main result is that an individual commercial paper default has no
signi¯cant impact on the commercial paper spread and does not result in a run
on MMFs. In a similar study, Miles (2001) compares the response of MMFs
and commercial banks to monetary shocks. He ¯nds that money market funds
have no di±culties withstanding a monetary shock.
More recently, a debate evolved around the question of whether commer-
cial banks have an advantage in hedging liquidity risk in comparison to other
¯nancial intermediaries such as MMFs. Gatev & Strahan (2006) argue that
the advantage of commercial banks in hedging against liquidity risk originates
from the fact that °ows into banks co-vary with market illiquidity. In other
words, following an illiquidity shock, commercial banks experience in°ows in-
stead of out°ows. Pennacchi (2006), however, ¯nds a similar result for MMFs.
Using vector autoregression (VAR) he ¯nds that after a liquidity shock, MMFs
experience in°ows and the dimension of these in°ows is similar to those of large
commercial banks.
This article contributes to the studies investigating ¯nancial stability of
MMFs in two important ways. First, we use individual money market funds
instead of aggregate data to assess the investor behavior conditioned on market
liquidity and fund portfolio liquidity. Second, we investigate the stability of
MMFs against liquidity shocks for a non-US sample. This permits us to gain
an insight into how the concept of MMFs works under a di®erent regulatory
setting and particularly under a °oating NAV.
3 Institutional Background
There are several di®erences between US and German money market funds
which potentially matter for the stability of MMFs.
6While money market funds have existed for quite some time in the United
States, they are fairly new in Germany and were only introduced in the mid-
nineties. As a consequence, money market funds play only a minor role in
Germany's ¯nancial system. In the United States, money market funds ac-
count for 25.8% of all mutual fund assets. In comparison, in Germany, money
market funds represent only 7.6% of all mutual fund assets.4
The majority of US money market funds have a constant net asset value
(CNAV) meaning that the value of one share, usually one dollar, remains
unchanged. Income is re°ected in an increase in the number of shares. In Ger-
many, MMFs have an accumulating net asset value (ANAV), meaning that
they are priced mark-to-market. Income of the fund is directly re°ected by
an increase in the share value. Gorton & Pennacchi (1992) argue that the
popularity of constant net asset value in the US is mostly due to a simpli¯ed
tax treatment.
To maintain a ¯xed asset value, US MMFs use amortized cost valuation.
This method can lead to arbitrage possibilities when the valuation method
deviates from the mark-to-market value.5 If the market price decreases and
the amortized cost valuation overprices the share value substantially, there is
an incentive for investors to withdraw their money. In this way, a ¯xed net
asset value makes MMFs more vulnerable to runs. On the other hand, market
discipline forces MMFs with a constant net asset value to reduce the risk of
their portfolio.
In both the US and Germany, MMFs have to invest in securities with a
maximum maturity of one year. In the US, the weighted average maturity of
a money market fund is not allowed to exceed 90 days. This regulation was
introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1991 in an
e®ort to increase the stability of MMFs (Gorton & Pennacchi 1992). Unlike
the US, there is no regulation concerning the average maturity of German
MMFs.
Probably the most important di®erence between US and German money
market funds is that US MMFs are subject to an implicit insurance. Issuers of
4Figures refer to the end of 2007. Sources: Investment Company Institute (ICI) Fact
Book 2008 and Deutsche Bundesbank Capital Market Statistics (Kapitalmarktstatistik).
5For further details on the method and the magnitude of arbitrage see Lyon (1984).
7money market fund promise to never \break the buck". This means that the
fund issuer guarantees that the value will never fall below one dollar. Hence,
an investor can be sure to get back at least the money invested. This is no
legal obligation but, historically, the sponsoring organizations have bailed out
troubled money market funds (Gup 1998). Bailouts of US money market funds
also took place during the subprime mortgage crisis. In the course of the sub-
prime crisis, at least 17 ¯nancial companies bought low-valued securities from
their MMFs to avoid a negative return.6 German issuers of money market
funds do not provide insurance for their funds or at least do not announce it
a-priori. The lack of an implicit insurance increases investor uncertainty which
may ultimately contribute to runs.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample contains a survivorship-bias free sample of all German retail money
market funds.7 In order to make funds comparable, we only consider MMFs
which invest in e-denominated securities. Our main data source is the monthly
capital market statistics (Kapitalmarktstatistik) of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Further, data on the monthly returns were obtained from Thomson Finan-
cial Datastream and data on the annual expense ratios, de¯ned as operat-
ing expenses over total assets, originate from the German Federal Association
of Investment Companies (Bundesverband Deutscher Investmentgesellschaften,
BVI).
Returns are calculated on the assumption that dividends are reinvested
immediately. Figure 1 displays the annualized returns of German MMFs in
comparison to the return of a 3-month German treasury bill (Bubill) in the
period 1996/01 - 2008/06. The returns of MMFs usually closely follow the
returns of short-term government securities. During the subprime crisis, how-
ever, we observe a sharp drop in the mean return of MMFs.
6See The New York Times, July 11, 2008, p. 8
7There are a number of MMFs registered in Luxembourg and marketed in Germany.
Unfortunately, we do not have any data on these funds.
8[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 highlights that the 3-month Bubill rate can serve as a natural
benchmark to compare the performance of MMFs. Therefore, we calculate
excess returns by subtracting the 3-month Bubill rate from the funds' net re-
turns. Other studies (e.g. Dahlquist et al. 2000, Christo®ersen & Musto 2002)
use a relative benchmark (i.e. an index of all money market funds) to compare
the performance of MMFs. Since the average performance of MMFs dropped
sharply during the second half of 2007, using a relative benchmark is not ade-
quate for our purposes.
The mean excess return is -46.3 basis points (see Table 1). A negative
average excess return is, at ¯rst glance surprising but MMFs generally earn
less than short-term treasury securities and more than insured bank deposits
(Koppenhaver & Sapp 2005). This is due to management fees which are nec-
essary to run the fund. The investor values these intermediary services, such
as diversi¯cation, active maturity management and liquidity services, and is
willing to pay the fees instead of directly investing in treasury securities.8
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Figure 2 displays the median, 25th and 75th percentile of MMFs' excess
returns in the period 1996/01 - 2008/06. The ¯gure shows that the median
money market fund generally underperforms the 3-month Bubill. However,
there are funds that outperformed and achieved a return above the treasury
security return. Starting in the second half of 2007, we observe a marked drop
in the median excess return. In fact, the majority of funds actually posted
negative excess returns. However, all funds were not equally a®ected by the
crisis. While the performance of some funds dropped considerably, other funds
continued to achieve a return at or above the benchmark.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Money market funds report their holdings on a monthly basis to the Bun-
desbank. Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1 and the asset compo-
sition at the end of each calender year is displayed in Table 2. Commercial
8Koppenhaver & Sapp (2005) estimate the value for intermediary services to be around
43 basis points for an US sample of treasury money market funds in the period 1995-2001.
9papers are de¯ned as short-term securities issued at a discount by ¯nancial
and non-¯nancial issuers and do not include asset-backed securities. Treasury
securities are all securities issued by European governments and play only a
minor role in our sample. All securities which are neither commercial papers
nor treasury securities are summarized under debt securities. This broad group
of assets represents the majority of assets held by MMFs and consists mainly
of ¯xed and °oating rate securities but also asset-backed securities. Further,
bank deposits play an important but declining role for MMFs.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As can be seen in Table 2, MMFs increased their share of debt securities
continuously until 2006 up to 81%. This is presumably due to the fact that
these assets earned a higher return than alternative assets (i.e. bank deposits
or commercial papers). With the start of the liquidity crisis in 2007, total net
assets decreased by an amount of around e10 billion, accounting for a third
of all MMFs assets under management (see also Figure 3). During the crisis,
MMFs reduced their share of debt securities and increased the share of more
secure assets such as commercial papers or bank deposits.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Note that MMFs also experienced out°ows in earlier periods, for exam-
ple in 2004. These out°ows, however, did not have a negative impact on the
returns, supposedly because the money market was relatively liquid at that
time. Such out°ows could have been motivated by the low absolute return of
MMFs at that time or by other more attractive investment opportunities.
The capital market statistics enable us to directly observe in°ows and out-





We approximate aggregate money market liquidity by the spread between
the 6-month Euribor (Euro Interbank O®ered Rate) and the 6-month Bubill
rate. The spread between interbank loans and government bonds can gener-
ally be assigned to both credit or liquidity risk. Grinblatt (2001) argues that
10an interbank loan is essentially risk free and the spread between the two as-
sets has to be attributed to their di®erences in liquidity. An interbank loan
is rather illiquid because it cannot easily be converted back. A government
bond, on the other hand, can more easily be sold before it matures. The di®er-
ence in return between the interbank rate and government bonds is therefore
referred to as convenience yield. Recent empirical studies (e.g. Fontaine &
Garcia 2007, FeldhÄ utter & Lando 2008) ¯nd that the majority of this money
market spread can be attributed to a liquidity premium. During the ¯nancial
market crisis, the Euribor-Bubill spread widened sharply. This rise was largely
due to concerns about counterparty credit risk which resulted in liquidity in
the interbank market drying up. Hence, while this spread predominantly re-
°ects liquidity risk during normal market episodes, credit risk and liquidity
risk become intrinsically intertwined during stress periods.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows the spread between the 6-month Euribor and the 6-month
Bubill rate for the period 1999/01 - 2008/06.9 In the period 2001 until the ¯rst
half of 2007, the money market experienced a time of relatively high liquidity.
With the beginning of the second half of 2007 we observe an increase in money
market spread of more than 60 basis points.
4.2 Persistence of Returns
Money market fund returns generally show a strong persistence, which has
been documented in several studies (Domian & Reichenstein 1998, Christof-
fersen & Musto 2002, Dahlquist et al. 2000). As a starting point for our anal-
ysis of the causes of runs on money market funds, we estimate the ¯rst-order
autocorrelation of annual returns using the Fama-MacBeth method. The au-
tocorrelation coe±cient is 0.54 and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (see Table
3).10 We therefore reject the null hypothesis that past performance is un-
related to future performance. Persistence also holds for several sub-samples,
however, in the sub-sample including the crisis year 2007, signi¯cance weakens.
9Since the Euribor was only established in 1999, we will only use the reduced sample in
our further investigation.
10For details on the estimation method, see Grinblatt & Titman (1992) or Horst & Verbeek
(2000)
11[Insert Table 3 about here]
In addition, we employ a non-parametric method, suggested by Brown et al.
(1992) and Brown & Goetzmann (1995), to measure performance persistence.
This method allows us to obtain a disaggregate view of persistence. In a
¯rst step, we separate the sample for each year into winning and losing funds.
Winners are de¯ned as funds which are above the median return and losers are
smaller or equal to the median return. In a second step, we consider repeated
winners and losers. Winner-Winner (WW) denotes funds that were winners
in the previous year and are also winners in the current year. Further groups
are established in the same way: Loser-Loser (LL), Winner-Loser (WL) and
Loser-Winner (LW). Table 4 shows the contingency tables for each year. It
also reports the number of new funds in the sample and the funds that drop
out of the sample.11 We also distinguish whether the fund was a winning fund
the period before dropping out (Winner-Gone) or a losing fund (Loser-Gone).
For each year we calculate the odds-ratio (OR):
OR = (WW ¢ LL)=(WL ¢ LW) (2)
Under the null hypothesis that performance in the previous year is unrelated to
the performance of the current year, the odds-ratio equals one. The logarithm




Table 4 summarizes the results. In seven out of eleven years, we reject the
null hypothesis of independence on a 10% signi¯cance level. This means that
in the majority of years, the winners of the previous year are also the winners
of the current year.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
11The di®erence in the number of funds in comparison to Table 2 originates from the fact
that a fund has to exist for two whole calender years.
12We follow Brown & Goetzmann (1995, p. 687) and approximate the standard error of















12To assess the overall signi¯cance, we employ Pearson's p¸-Test (e.g. Rao
1952, p. 44). Under the null hypothesis, the p-values pi from the individ-
ual tests are equally distributed on the [0,1] interval. It follows that ¸ =
Pk
i=1(¡2 ¢ ln(pi)) has a Â2 distribution with 2k degrees of freedom where k is
the number of individual tests. The overall test rejects the null hypothesis of
independence on conventional signi¯cance levels. This underpins the evidence
for the persistence of money market fund returns found in the Fama-MacBeth
regression (see Table 3).
Both the parametric and non-parametric method provide strong evidence
for overall performance persistence. The advantage of contingency tables is
that we are able to disaggregate the test and investigate persistence period by
period (Brown et al. 1992). In the years of extremely high market liquidity
(2002-2006) performance persistence is high. In 2005 there are 18 winning
funds. 16 of these 18 winning funds are also winners in 2006. In contrast to
this, we ¯nd a reversal in outperformance during the subprime crisis: most
winners of 2006, a year of extremely high market liquidity, are losers in 2007,
a year of extremely low market liquidity. This result suggests that outperfor-
mance of money market funds is related to market-wide liquidity. We thus
proceed to investigate performance persistence in money market funds more
closely.
4.3 Outperformance and Liquidity Risk
The persistence of fund returns has been attributed to the strong persistence of
expense ratios (see e.g. Domian & Reichenstein 1998, Christo®ersen & Musto
2002). Since investors face costs when switching from one fund to another fund,
managers are able to charge higher fees without losing existing investors. For
this reason, some funds can persistently underperform others without losing
their investors.
The year-by-year inspection of performance persistence showed that per-
sistence is not common in all years. There are years without persistence and,
most notably, a pronounced reversal in the performance distribution from 2006
to 2007. More importantly, this happened without a change in expense ratios.
Therefore, the expense ratio alone cannot be the sole explanation for perfor-
13mance and persistence of MMFs.
Koppenhaver (1999) ¯nds that, in addition to expenses, the portfolio com-
position also determines MMFs' returns. Fund managers can enhance their
returns by increasing the riskiness of the portfolio. We incorporate this ar-
gument and condition the cross-sectional di®erences of money market fund
returns on the liquidity of their portfolio. We run the following cross-sectional
regression for each month:
Exc: Returnit = ¯0 + ¯1Liq: Assetsi;t¡1 + (4)
¯2Sizei;t¡1 + ¯3Expense Ratioi + "i;t;
where Liq: Assetsi;t¡1 is the share of treasury securities, bank deposits and
commercial papers. These traditional money market instruments are arguably
the most liquid assets in the portfolio of a money market fund. More im-
portantly, this variable does not include asset-backed securities, which bear
a higher credit and liquidity risk. To account for possible economics of scale
we include Sizei;t¡1 measured by the logarithm of total assets of the fund
(Domian & Reichenstein 1998, Chen et al. 2004). Further, we include the
Expense Ratioi of the fund as a control, which is the average expense ratio of
the fund.13
This regression is similar to the one of Koppenhaver (1999), but we ex-
tend this analysis by further investigating the relationship between portfolio
composition and performance over time as a function of market-wide liquidity.
Acharya & Pedersen (2005) report that liquid assets have superior performance
in illiquid times and inferior performance in liquid times. We follow Massa &
Phalippou (2005) who argue that the relationship of portfolio liquidity and per-
formance varies over time as a function of market-wide liquidity. This leads to
our ¯rst testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Funds that hold more illiquid assets outperform in
liquid times and underperform in illiquid times.
13Taking the average for each fund is justi¯ed by the fact that expense ratios almost do
not vary over time in our sample. The main part of the overall variation (standard deviation:
0.194) can be attributed to cross-sectional variation (standard deviation: 0.183).
14To test this hypothesis, we run the cross-sectional regression displayed in
equation 4 for each month. Next, we sort the months by market-wide liquidity
into four quartiles and average the coe±cients for each of the four groups. The
results of this Fama-MacBeth regression are displayed in Table 5. The impact
of liquid assets varies across the four quartiles. In line with our hypothesis,
during the most liquid months (1st quartile), the share of liquid assets has a
negative impact on performance. The negative impact of liquid assets on per-
formance decreases for the less liquid assets (2nd and 3rd quartile). In times
of extreme illiquidity (4th quartile), liquid assets even have a positive impact
on excess return. We ¯nd no evidence for economics of scale.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
We further elaborate on how market illiquidity and portfolio liquidity in-
teract by running a ¯xed e®ects regression displayed in equation 5. We explore
how a speci¯c money fund manager can enhance the return by changing the
portfolio. Using ¯xed e®ects we account for possible endogeneity that might
result from a correlation of unobserved fund-speci¯c attributes with the re-
gressors. The empirical model is speci¯ed as follows:
Exc: Returnit = ®i + ¯1Liq: Assetsi;t¡1 + ¯2Spreadt + (5)
¯3Liq: Assetsi;t¡1 ¤ Spreadt + ¯4Sizei;t¡1 + "i;t;
where Liq: Assetsi;t¡1 is, as mentioned before, the share of traditional money
market instruments (i.e. bank deposits, treasury securities and commercial
papers). The share of liquid assets enters directly into the regression equation
and in interaction with our measure for market illiquidity Spreadt. Hypoth-
esis 1 suggests a negative ¯1: in very liquid times, liquid assets should have
a negative impact on performance. It also follows from hypothesis 1 that the
coe±cient of the interaction term ¯3 should be positive: in illiquid times, liquid
assets should have a positive e®ect on performance.
We again control for economics of scale by including the log of total assets
Sizei;t¡1. Unobservable fund characteristics are captured by the individual ef-
fect ®i. This also includes the expense ratio which is, as shown before, largely
15invariant over time.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The results are displayed in Table 6. First, we estimate equation 5 without
considering market illiquidity for two di®erent samples: the sample before the
liquidity crisis on the money market (1999-2006) and the full sample (1999-
2008). Results can be found in columns (1) and (3). In the ¯rst sample period,
liquid assets have a negative impact on returns. This ¯rst period was char-
acterized by relatively high market liquidity, as can be seen in Figure 4. In
contrast, for the full sample period, liquid assets obtain a positive sign. This
is a further indication that the extreme market illiquidity since the middle of
2007 had a di®erential impact on performance through the portfolio composi-
tion. Controlling for market liquidity thus appears paramount.
In light of this evidence, we show the results of the fully speci¯ed model in
column (2) and (4). The coe±cient of Liq: Assetsi;t¡1 ¯1 is, as hypothesized,
negative across the two periods indicating that funds with liquid assets under-
perform. The interaction coe±cient with market illiquidity ¯3 is signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero and positive. This underlines that liquid funds outperform
during illiquid market episodes thus further corroborating our hypothesis. In-
cluding market-wide liquidity directly and as an interaction term also improves
the model's explanatory power considerably measured by the within R2. The
pre-crisis sample (1999-2006) shows that this result is not driven by the crisis
only.
Since money market liquidity was persistently high from 2001 until the
¯rst half of 2007, illiquid MMFs persistently outperformed liquid MMFs. Per-
sistence of MMF returns is therefore not only the result of persistence in the
expense ratios but also due to the portfolio structure and the persistence of
market-wide liquidity.
For robustness, we also consider a dynamic setting where the share of liq-
uid assets is modeled as an endogenous variable. We therefore instrument Liq.
Assets by its ¯rst and second lag. The results presented in Table 8 remain ro-
bust, i.e. liquid funds underperform in liquid times but outperform in illiquid
times. It should be noted that the dynamic ¯xed e®ects estimator is consistent
16in panels with long time series such as ours given that the Nickell bias vanishes
as the time dimension increases (Nickell 1981).
This evidence shows that enhancing returns by investing in more risky and
thus less liquid assets comes at a cost. If market-wide liquidity drops, i.e. due
to heightened counterparty risk, managers face problems when investors re-
deem their shares. They have to sell relatively illiquid assets at ¯re sale prices,
which results in a reduction of returns. This in turn might lead to further
out°ows. An illiquidity shock can therefore trigger a self-ful¯lling run. For
this reason, we assess the °ows in and out of MMFs conditional on market and
portfolio liquidity in the next section.
4.4 Market Illiquidity and Fund Flows
Having established that money market fund managers raised their portfolio
risk prior to the ¯nancial crisis to enhance their performance, we investigate
the investors' reaction to the deterioration of market liquidity.14 A market-
wide liquidity shock can a priori have two e®ects on investors (See Gorton
& Pennacchi 1992, Pennacchi 2006, Miles 2001). On the one hand, investors
can see money market funds as a safe haven, which would lead to in°ows into
money market funds. On the other hand, a sudden drop in liquidity can cause
investors to withdraw their money because they are concerned about a value
reduction. If other investors fear a reduction in value caused by the initial
redemptions, the liquidity shock can lead to a self-ful¯lling run.
The likelihood of a run crucially depends on the liquidity of the portfolio.
A withdrawal in illiquid times results in costs when the fund manager has to
liquidate assets at depressed market prices.15 Since it usually takes some days
for the fund manager to restore the cash balance, these costs mainly a®ect the
remaining investors in the fund. Therefore, redemptions impose a negative ex-
ternality on the remaining investors. If this externality becomes sizeable, the
14A number of events may have further impacted money market funds during the ¯nancial
crisis. The increase in deposit insurance ceilings and the dropping of coinsurance elements
in the second half of 2008 potentially present such events. With regard to the US, the
default of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent decline in the share value below USD1 of
the Primary Reserve Fund also marked such an event. Both events are not included in the
present analysis given that the data end in June 2008.
15This externality may be compounded when a large volume of assets is sold into the
market causing prices to decline further (see Coval & Sta®ord (2007)).
17expectation of other investors withdrawing their money can cause the remain-
ing investors to withdraw their money as well, resulting in a self-ful¯lling run.
The negative externality, and consequently the likelihood of a run, increases
with market illiquidity and the illiquidity of the portfolio. Our second testable
hypothesis therefore is:
Hypothesis 2: In illiquid times, funds that hold illiquid assets are
more likely to experience a run than funds that
hold liquid assets.
We de¯ne a run on a money market fund as a signi¯cant withdrawal by in-
vestors. We thus ¯rst test our second hypothesis by examining the cumulative
net °ows of German MMFs during the subprime crisis (2007/07 - 2008/06) in
Figure 5. Money market funds in 2007/06 are sorted into four groups according
to their share of liquid assets.16 Overall, money market funds lost e10.8 billion
in the crisis period (compare also Figure 3). The quartile of funds with the
most illiquid portfolio lost around e7.2 billion, which accounts for the major-
ity of all out°ows. In relation to their total assets before the crisis (2007/06),
the quartile of the most illiquid funds lost around 60% of their assets, which
indicates that a run on these funds took place. This clearly shows that the
intensity of out°ows decreases with portfolio liquidity. The most liquid funds
only experienced out°ows of around 5%.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
We evaluate the impact of market liquidity on MMFs' °ows more closely with
the following empirical model:
Netflowit = ®i + ¯1Liq: Assetsi;t¡1 + ¯2Exc: Returni;t¡1 + ¯3Spreadt
+¯4Spreadt ¤ Liq: Assetsi;t¡1 + ¯5Spreadt ¤ Exc: Returni;t¡1
+¯6Sizei;t¡1 + ¯7Agei;t¡1 + "i;t (6)
where Netflowit is the relative net °ow of fund i in period t. The °ow is
measured relative to total assets of the previous month. Liq: Assetsi;t¡1 is our
16Share of liquid assets by quartile (valuation date 2007/06): Q25: 0.04, Q50: 0.10, Q75:
0.16, Q100 : 0:65
18previously used proxy for portfolio liquidity. We include past excess return
Exc: Returni;t¡1 because investors of mutual funds typically react to good or
bad performance of the fund (e.g. Sirri & Tufano 1998). More recently, a per-
formance °ow relationship has also been documented for MMFs (Koppenhaver
& Sapp 2005). Market illiquidity Spreadt is again measured by the spread be-
tween the Euribor and the Bubill rate, both maturing in 6 months.
The money market spread enters into the regression equation individually
and as an interaction term with portfolio liquidity. Hypothesis 2 suggests that
investors react di®erently to a market-wide liquidity shock depending on the
liquidity of the portfolio. An increase in the money market spread alone should
lead to out°ows, which should result in a negative ¯3. Liquid funds, on the
other hand, should experience less out°ows when facing market illiquidity. We
therefore expect the coe±cient of the interaction term ¯4 to be positive. The
regression equation also includes an interaction term of market illiquidity with
past excess return to test whether the performance °ow relationship changes
in liquid and illiquid times.
Again, the log of total net assets is added as a control variable to capture
the fact that smaller funds typically grow faster than large funds. Similarly,
we include the age in years as a control variable into the regression. Older
funds are also associated with less in°ows (Sirri & Tufano 1998). Recently
established funds usually experience very large in°ows in relative terms. This
can lead to an outlier problem and skew the results (Berk & Tonks 2007). We
thus only include funds which have existed for at least two years.
The results are displayed in Table 7. We estimate equation 6 ¯rst using fund
¯xed e®ects (Panel A) and second using fund and time ¯xed e®ects (Panel B).
The control variables Sizei;t¡1 and Agei;t¡1 have the expected negative sign.
We ¯nd a positive performance °ow relationship. An increase in excess return
leads to a higher net °ow into money market funds. The performance sensitiv-
ity of investors is likely to be behind the reason why fund managers increased
the risk of their portfolio and enhanced their funds in the ¯rst place. Similarly,
we ¯nd some evidence that liquid assets lead to lower net °ows in liquid times.
This is in line with the positive performance °ow relationship. Liquid assets
earn a lower return in good times and investors respond by withdrawing their
money.
19A sudden increase in market illiquidity has a negative e®ect on °ows, which
con¯rms our second hypothesis for a run on illiquid funds. An increase in liq-
uid assets limits out°ows and counteracts this ¯rst e®ect. Funds with a large
amount of liquid assets are less prone to a decline in market liquidity and thus
less vulnerable to a sudden rise in withdrawals. Figure 6 plots the marginal
e®ect of market illiquidity on net °ows as a function of portfolio liquidity.17
Money market funds with less than 30% of liquid assets experience signi¯cant
out°ows after an illiquidity shock (at the 5% signi¯cance level). In contrast,
there are no signi¯cant out°ows after an illiquidity shock for funds with a share
of above 30%.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
These results show the crucial importance of portfolio liquidity in prevent-
ing runs. MMFs that are truly narrow are immune to runs and are thus less
likely to need investor insurance such as that currently under consideration
in the US. By contrast, MMFs that enhance their returns by deviating from
the narrow to a wider portfolio structure expose themselves to the risk of a run.
One caveat is that there might be a reverse causality between °ows and
some of the explanatory variables. Investor °ows might also a®ect the liquidity
of the fund, its return and size. To address this issue, we run a two-stage least
squares regression instrumenting these variables by their ¯rst and second lags.
The results are displayed in Table 9 and show that our main ¯ndings stay
unchanged.










= Var[¯3] + Liq: Assets2 ¢ Var[¯4] + 2 ¢ Liq: Assets ¢ Cov[¯3;¯4]
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This paper shows that in liquid times some MMF managers enhanced their
returns by investing in less liquid assets. We provide evidence that this pur-
suit of higher returns is motivated by investors reacting to bad performance
by withdrawing their money. By investing in illiquid assets, funds can outper-
form other funds as long as liquidity in the market is high. Investing in less
liquid assets, however, widens the narrow structure of money market funds
and makes them vulnerable to runs. During the liquidity crisis of 2007/2008,
we observe runs on money market funds with enhanced and illiquid portfolios.
Money market funds with more liquid portfolios, in contrast, had no signi¯cant
out°ows and functioned as a safe haven.
The study shows the risk involved in investing in illiquid assets when an
open-ended structure is involved. Most importantly, this paper provides evi-
dence that runs are even possible in the, usually highly liquid, money market
segment.
The possibility of a run on these ¯nancial intermediaries has led to recent
reforms of the regulation of money market funds in Europe and the US which
aim to ensure the stability of money market funds. Common to the reforms in
both jurisdictions are the more stringent requirements on liquidity and credit
risk but also with regard to disclosure. As a consequence, this should already
help private investors to gain a better insight into the risks they are taking
when investing in money market funds. Before the ¯nancial crisis, only limited
information on the asset composition of German MMFs was available to the
public and not standardized. Greater transparency should allow investors to
select funds based on their liquidity and risk preferences. The two-tier sepa-
ration introduced in Europe is a further step in this direction.
Further, insurance provided by the fund issuer might play an important role
in the stability of MMFs. During the course of the subprime crisis, MMF as-
sets largely remained stable in the US where an implicit insurance is provided.
Gorton & Pennacchi (1992) argue that an implicit insurance can reduce the
risk of a run on MMFs in two ways: from the investor's perspective, insurance
can establish trust in the money market fund and thus avoid a self-ful¯lling
run. From the manager's perspective, insurance paid by the fund issuer gives
21an incentive to reduce the riskiness of the portfolio. The current discussion
in the US on the establishment of a liquidity facility for money market funds
may thus present a valid instrument to quell runs.
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256 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics for the fund-speci¯c variables. Excess return is the
annualized net return minus the 3-month Bubill rate in percentage points. Relative net
°ows are in°ows minus out°ows in relation to total assets (in percent). Commercial papers
are de¯ned as short-term securities issued at a discount from ¯nancial and non-¯nancial
issuers. Treasury bills include all European government securities. Debt securities are
all securities that are neither commercial papers nor treasury securities. Debt securities
include °oating and ¯xed rate securities but also asset-backed securities. All asset classes
are measured as a share of total assets. Age is measured in years since inception. Size is the
log of total net assets. Expense ratio is the operating expenses divided by the average assets
under management (measured in percent). Data sources are Thomson Financial Datastream,
the capital market statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank (BBK) and the German Federal
Association of Investment Companies (Bundesverband Deutscher Investmentgesellschaften,
BVI)
25th 75th
Mean Variance Percentile Percentile Source
Excess Return -0.463 2.641 -0.651 0.055 Datastream
Rel. Net Flow 0.967 422.84 -2.894 3.240 BBK
Debt Securities 0.736 0.056 0.621 0.919 BBK
Commercial Papers 0.067 0.018 0.000 0.068 BBK
Treasury Securities 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 BBK
Other Assets 0.025 0.005 0.005 0.014 BBK
Bank Deposits 0.167 0.040 0.038 0.208 BBK
Age 7.07 12.19 4.58 9.92 BBK
Size 18.84 3.63 17.44 20.17 BBK

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 3: Performance Persistence of Money Market
Funds: First-Order Autocorrelation
This table shows the ¯rst-order autocorrelation of MMFs' annual
returns. We estimate the ¯rst-order autocorrelation using the
Fama-MacBeth method. For each year we run a cross-sectional
regression of lagged return on return and average the coe±cients
over time. The results are displayed for the whole sample and
two sub-samples. Fama-MacBeth standard errors are given in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively.
Sample Period: 1996 - 2007 1996-2001 2002-2007
Exc. Returnt¡1 0.537*** 0.564*** 0.510*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.21)
Constant -0.977** -1.030* -0.925
(0.37) (0.51) (0.58)
No. of Obs. 359 152 207
No. of Years 12 6 6



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 5: The In°uence of Portfolio Liquidity on Returns:
Cross-Sectional Regressions
Note: All observations are sorted by money market illiquidity (spread between 6-month
Euribor and 6-month Bubill rate) and grouped into four quartiles. The table reports av-
erage coe±cients of monthly cross-sectional regressions. Liquid assets include short-term
government securities, commercial papers and bank deposits. Size is measured as the log of
total assets. Expense ratio is the ratio of annual expenses divided by average assets. Fama-
MacBeth standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Money Market Liquidity
(liquid) (illiquid)
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
Liq. Assetst¡1 -0.444*** -0.268** -0.194* 2.043***
(0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.69)
Sizet¡1 0.020 0.000 -0.007 -0.050
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Expense Ratio -0.627*** -0.937*** -1.018*** 0.245
(0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.44)
Constant -0.00766 0.361 0.319 -0.591
(0.30) (0.27) (0.33) (0.88)
No. of Obs. 895 1000 980 949
No. of Funds 27 28 28 30
R2 0.189 0.241 0.287 0.202
30Table 6: The In°uence of Portfolio Liquidity on Returns:
Fixed E®ects Regression
The table shows the ¯xed e®ects regression of explanatory variables on excess
return. Size is measured in log of total assets, Liq. Assets is the share of traditional
money market instruments (government securities, commercial papers and bank
deposits). Spread is the spread between the 6-month Euribor and the 6-month
Bubill rate. The regression is performed for two sample periods: the time before
the liquidity crisis (1999-2006) and the full sample (1999-2008). Robust standard
errors clustered at the fund level are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1999-2006 1999-2008
Liq. Assetst¡1 -0.217** -0.402*** 0.655** -0.861**
(0.11) (0.13) (0.29) (0.34)
Spreadt -1.799*** -3.361***
(0.19) (0.83)
Spreadt* Liq. Assetst¡1 1.323*** 5.378***
(0.44) (1.75)
Sizet¡1 0.0767** 0.0724** 0.155* 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06)
Constant -1.677** -1.274** -3.537** -1.37
(0.65) (0.61) (1.61) (1.18)
No. of Obs. 3358 3355 4050 4046
No. of Funds 45 45 49 49
Within R2 0.011 0.058 0.008 0.118
31Table 7: The In°uence of Market Illiquidity on Fund Flows
Note: The table shows a ¯xed e®ects regression of fund net °ows (mea-
sured in relation to total assets). Liquid Assets is the portfolio share of
treasury securities, bank deposits and commercial papers. Excess return
denotes the annualized return in excess of the 3-month Bubill rate, spread
is the spread between the 6-month Euribor and the 6-month Bubill rate
and serves as a proxy for money market illiquidity. Size measured as the
log of total assets and age in years are added as control variables. In Panel
A we control for fund ¯xed e®ects and in Panel B we additionally con-
trol for time ¯xed e®ects. The sample contains money market funds from
1999/01 - 2008/06. We only include funds with an age above two years so
that the large growth rates of young funds do not skew the results. Robust
standard errors clustered at the fund level are given in parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Panel A: Fund Fixed E®ects
(1) (2) (3)
Liq. Assetst¡1 -2.742 -5.036* -5.052*
(2.23) (2.83) (2.85)




Spreadt * Liq. Assetst¡1 11.75** 12.18**
(4.70) (4.70)
Spreadt * Exc. Returnt¡1 -0.74
(0.45)
Sizet¡1 -1.058* -1.297** -1.309**
(0.57) (0.57) (0.57)
Aget¡1 -0.478*** -0.315** -0.310**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Constant 25.02** 29.70*** 30.08***
(10.88) (10.87) (10.95)
Fund Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies No No No
No. of Obs. 3687 3687 3687
No. of Funds 44 44 44
Within R2 0.027 0.033 0.033
(continued)
32Table 7 -Continued
Panel B: Fund and Time Fixed E®ects
(1) (2) (3)
Liq. Assetst¡1 -2.248 -5.585* -5.495*
(2.39) (2.78) (2.79)
Exc. Returnt¡1 0.569*** 0.500*** 1.100**
(0.17) (0.16) (0.49)
Spreadt - -
Spreadt * Liq. Assetst¡1 13.19** 13.30**
(5.08) (5.06)
Spreadt * Exc. Returnt¡1 -0.699
(0.48)
Sizet¡1 -1.044* -1.157* -1.159*
(0.60) (0.59) (0.60)
Aget¡1 -0.873*** -1.099*** -1.108***
(0.23) (0.26) (0.26)
Constant 28.00** 31.30*** 31.41***
(10.85) (10.85) (10.90)
Fund Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 3687 3687 3687
No. of Funds 44 44 44
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Figure 1: Return of Money Market Funds and 3-month
Bubill Return
The ¯gure shows the monthly (annualized) return of an equally
weighted portfolio of German retail money market funds (MMFs)
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Figure 2: Excess Returns of Money Market Funds
This ¯gure shows the distribution of annualized excess returns (in
percentage points) of German retail money market funds. The
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Figure 3: Total Net Assets of Money Market Funds
The ¯gure displays the total net assets of German retail money
market funds (left-hand side) and the monthly change in total
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Figure 4: Euribor-Bubill Spread
This ¯gure shows the monthly average spread between the
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(b) Relative Net Flows 2007/07 - 2008/06
Figure 5: Net Flows by Portfolio Liquidity
Money market funds in 2007/06 are grouped into four quartiles
according to their liquidity. We use the share of treasury securi-
ties, bank deposits and commercial papers as proxy for liquidity.
Figure 5(a) shows the cumulated net °ows (in°ows minus out-
°ows) for the four groups of funds in million e. Figure 5(b)
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Figure 6: Marginal E®ect of Market Illiquidity on Net
Flows
This ¯gure displays the marginal e®ect of market illiquidity on
net °ows as a function of portfolio liquidity (solid line). 95% con-
¯dence intervals are also provided (dotted lines). Estimates are
taken from Table 7, Panel A, Column (3). Market illiquidity is
measured by the Euribor-Bubill spread and portfolio liquidity is
approximated by the share of traditional money market instru-
ments.
37Table 8: Robustness Check: The In°uence of Portfolio
Liquidity on Returns: Dynamic Speci¯cation
(2SLS)
The table shows a two-stage least squares (2SLS) ¯xed e®ects regression of explana-
tory variables on excess return, where Liq. Assets is assumed to be endogenous
and is instrumented by its ¯rst and second lag. Size is measured in log of total as-
sets, Liq. Assets is the share of traditional money market instruments (government
securities, commercial papers and bank deposits). Spread is the spread between
the 6-month Euribor and the 6-month Bubill rate. The regression is performed for
two sample periods: the time before the liquidity crisis (1999-2006) and the full
sample (1999-2008). Robust standard errors clustered at the fund level are given
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1999-2006 1999-2008
Liq. Assetst -0.242** -0.581*** 0.474*** -0.581**
(0.112) (0.212) (0.177) (0.288)
Spreadt -1.923*** -2.158***
(0.279) (0.500)
Spreadt* Liq. Assetst 1.925*** 3.541***
(0.683) (1.140)
Exc. Returnt¡1 0.110** 0.0684 0.389*** 0.302***
(0.0427) (0.0452) (0.0970) (0.0952)
Sizet 0.0735** 0.0704** 0.114** 0.0802*
(0.0310) (0.0297) (0.0546) (0.0486)
No. of Obs. 3310 3310 3996 3996
No. of Funds 45 45 49 49
38Table 9: Robustness Check: The In°uence of Market Illiq-
uidity on Fund Flows (2SLS)
Note: The table shows a two-stage least squares (2SLS) ¯xed e®ects re-
gression of fund net °ows (measured in relation to total assets). Liquid
assets, excess return and fund size are assumed to be endogenous and are
instrumented by their ¯rst and second lag. Liquid Assets is the portfolio
share of treasury securities, bank deposits and commercial papers. Excess
return denotes the annualized return in excess of the 3-month Bubill rate,
spread is the spread between the 6-month Euribor and the 6-month Bubill
rate and serves as a proxy for money market illiquidity. Size measured
as the log of total assets and age in years are added as control variables.
In column (1) and (2) we control for fund ¯xed e®ects and in column (3)
we additionally control for time ¯xed e®ects. The sample contains money
market funds from 1999/01 - 2008/06. We only include funds with an age
above two years so that the large growth rates of young funds do not skew
the results. Robust standard errors clustered at the fund level are given
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Flowt¡1 0.0873 0.0906* 0.0748
(0.0542) (0.0539) (0.0564)
Liq. Assetst -12.51** -12.55* -12.64*
(5.127) (6.563) (6.465)
Exc. Returnt 1.005** 2.557 3.647
(0.488) (8.281) (5.886)
Spreadt -11.28*** -12.75*** -
(3.460) (3.068)
Spreadt * Liq. Assetst 40.39*** 41.88** 42.98**
(14.87) (17.47) (18.74)
Spreadt * Exc. Returnt -2.199 -3.342
(9.015) (6.348)
Sizet -2.140*** -2.143*** -1.992***
(0.565) (0.510) (0.522)
Aget -0.163 -0.147 30.23*
(0.112) (0.180) (15.76)
Fund Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed E®ects No No Yes
No. of Obs. 3639 3639 3639
No. of Funds 44 44 44
39 
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